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Abstract
We model an innovators choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint deci-
sion in a multi-period licensing game with potential sequential innovations and some
irreversibility of technology transfer. We nd that it may be optimal to license the
innovation for less than the full length of the patent and that royalty contracts can
be used to overcome a time-consistency problem faced by the innovator. Our results
suggest that licensing contracts based on royalty have a longer duration than xed-fee
licenses and are more likely to be used in industries where sequential innovations are
frequent. (JEL D21, D40, L13)
Keywords: Innovation, Licensing, Patent, Royalty, Technology Leakage, Time Con-
sistency.
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In this paper, we study an outsider innovators optimal licensing policy. In particular,
we consider the optimal payment scheme and the duration of licensing contracts in a setting
with potential sequential innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfers. Our
main ndings are:
1. It can be optimal to issue a license for less than the length of the patent;
2. Even under complete information and risk neutrality, royalty can be more protable
than xed-fee licensing;
3. Licensing contracts based on royalty tend to have a longer duration;
4. Royalty contracts are more likely to be used in industries where sequential innovations
are frequent and intellectual property protection is weak.
Technology transfer through licensing is a common method to utilize a patent. A large
literature on technology licensing has studied the optimal payment scheme of selling a cost-
reducing innovation (Arrow 1962, Kamien and Tauman 1984, 1986, 2002, Katz and Shapiro
1986, Kamien, Oren and Tauman 1992; see Kamien 1992 for a survey). It has been shown
that licensing by means of a royalty is inferior to that of a xed-fee or an auction for an
outside innovator, regardless of the industry size or the magnitude of the innovation.
Subsequent studies have tried to explain the wide prevalence of royalties in practice by
examining the many variants of the standard model.1 These studies include models with
asymmetric information (Gallini and Wright 1990; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 1991;
Beggs, 1992; Poddar and Sinha, 2002; Sen, 2005), variation in the quality of innovation
(Rockett, 1990), product di¤erentiation (Muto, 1993; Wang and Yang, 1999; Poddar and
Sinha, 2004; Stamatopoulos and Tauman, 2003), moral hazard (Macho-Stadler, Martinez-
Giralt and Perez-Castrillo, 1996; Choi, 2001; Jensen and Thursby, 2001), risk aversion (Bous-
quet, Cremer, Ivaldi andWolkowicz, 1998), incumbent innovator (Shapiro, 1985; Wang, 1998,
1Rostoker (1984) nds that 39% of licensing contracts rely on royalties, while only 15% of them specify a
xed-fee. In the sample studied by Macho-Stadler, Martinez-Giralt and Perez-Castrillo (1996), nearly sixty
percent of the contracts are totally based on royalty.
2002; Kamien and Tauman, 2002; Sen, 2002; Sen and Tauman, 2003), Stackelberg leadership
(Filippini, 2001; Kabiraj, 2004, 2005) or strategic delegation (Saracho, 2002).
However, surprisingly few studies have examined the duration of technology licensing,
even though it is an important dimension of every contract. More concretely, should the
innovator license the innovation for the entire length of the patent, or should a series of short-
term contracts be used? While existing theoretical models implicitly assume that a license
remains in e¤ect for the duration of the patent, most actual contract agreements terminate
before the underlying patents expire. Anand and Khanna (2000) study the structure of
licensing contracts that involved at least one US participant and were signed during the
period 1990-93. They nd that no contract agreement lasts more than 10 years, even though
the length of patent protection ranges from 14 to 20 years in the US.2
A more interesting fact is the variation in the duration of licensing contracts. Macho-
Stadler, Martinez-Giralt and Perez-Castrillo (1996) study a sample of 241 contracts between
Spanish and foreign rms and nd that contracts based on royalties tend to have a longer
duration than xed-fee contracts. Of the contracts containing xed payments, 24.5% are one-
year contracts, while this proportion falls to 6.2% in the set of contracts containing royalty
payments. At the other extreme, 58% of the 174 contracts with royalty payments are long-
term contracts (at least ve years), while only 15% of the contracts with xed payments had
a duration of at least ve years. Using the same dataset, Mendi (2005) studies the impact
of contract duration in determining scheduled payments in technology transfer. He nds a
positive relationship between contract duration and the probability of the parties including
royalties in the rst period of the agreement.3
2In the United States, under current patent law, the term of patent are: (1) For applications led on or
after June 8, 1995, the patent term is 20 years from the ling date of the earliest US application to which
priority is claimed (excluding provisional applications). (2) For applications that were pending on and for
patents that were still in force on June 8, 1995, the patent term is either 17 years from the issue date or 20
years from the ling date of the earliest US application to which priority is claimed (excluding provisional
applications), the longer term applying. (3) Design patents, unlike utility patents, have a term of 14 years
from the date of issue.
3The author also provides a theoretical model to explain his empirical nding. His model is di¤erent from
ours in many aspects, among which the most crucial is that he takes the duration of contract as given, while
in our model it is endogenous.
3
In this paper, we introduce a model of technology licensing that analyzes the duration
of contracts as well as the optimal payment scheme. The model builds on two observa-
tions. First, technology advances are destructive. A new innovation often renders past ones
obsolete. This means that an innovator who engages in a series of innovations potentially
faces a time-consistency problem in technology licensing: once a license is sold, the innova-
tor may have an excessive incentive to invest in new technologies (Waldman 1996, Rey and
Tirole 2007). This decreases the value of the initial license. At the same time, it may be
too costly to write a complete long-term contract in which license fees are contingent upon
the outcome of risky investments for future improvements (Williamson 1975). Therefore, a
long-term xed-fee license may be sub-optimal.
Second, the transfer of knowledge is irreversible. Once transferred, it is di¢ cult for
the innovator to retract the knowledge from a licensee (Caves, Crookell and Killing 1983;
Brousseau, Coeurderoy and Chaserant 2007). This means that a licensee may be able to
utilize an innovation even after the license has expired. We call this "technology leakage"
and model it as the licensee retaining a fraction of the cost savings of the initial innovation
without renewing the license.4 Conceptually, we can think of a technology as embodying both
tangible assets and intangible know-how. While the termination of a license may stop the
use of tangible assets by past licensees, it is di¢ cult, if possible at all, to prevent them from
utilizing the technology know-how. The existence of technology leakage creates a potential
downside for short-term contracts.
In our model, there are two periods. An innovator sells licenses, which can last a single
period or two periods, by either xed fees or royalties. Whereas long-term xed-fee contracts
potentially prevent technology leakage, they distort the innovators incentive to invest in
subsequent innovations. Short-term xed-fee contracts or long-term xed-fee contracts with
opt-out clauses do better, but each is unable to entirely resolve the time-consistency problem
4Our use of the term "technology leakage" should be distinguished from the occasional uses in newspaper
articles (e.g., "Expulsions Tied To Fear Of Technology Leaks", Philip Taubman, New York Times, April 24,
1983) that refer to the more blatant theft of technologies. In our model, technology leakage is not illegal and
is present only because intellectual property protection is imperfect.
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because of technology leakage. Long-term royalty contracts do not have a time-consistency
problem, but royalty does not maximize the value of the initial innovation. Based on these
tradeo¤s, we derive conditions under which it is optimal for the innovator to license the
technology for less than the length of the patent and conditions under which the uses of
royalty contracts are optimal.
To our knowledge, Gandal and Rockett (1995) and Antelo (2009) are the only theoretical
papers that have examined the optimal duration of licensing contracts.5 The rst paper
focuses on the licensing of a sequence of exogenous innovations by xed fees. They derive
conditions under which the innovator licenses the initial technology bundled with all future
improvements and conditions under which licenses to each innovation are sold period-by-
period. The other paper focuses on royalties in a model of asymmetric information, in
which a licensees output in a short-term contract signals her cost. Neither paper compares
di¤erent payment schemes, nor are they concerned with the innovators time-consistency and
technology leakage problems identied in this paper.6
Our conceptualization of technology leakage is most closely related to papers by Macho-
Stadler et al. (1996) and Choi (2001), who have developed incomplete contract models of
a licensing relationship that is susceptible to moral hazard. They assume that the transfer
of technology know-how is costly and cannot be contracted directly. A royalty-based con-
tract is optimal because it reduces the innovators temptation of not actually transferring
all the know-how. While these papers and ours share the prediction that the use of royalty
is positively correlated with the amount of know-how involved in technology transfer, there
5Farrell and Shapiro (2008) consider a variable royalty rate, contingent upon the outcome of a court
challenge of the validity of the patent. In their model, the innovator o¤ers licenses to all downstream rms
by assumption, therefore a xed-fee license is o¤ered only if the downstream rm has no competition. In an
extension of their model, they consider short-term licenses, which are contracts that do not survive a nding
of validity.
6A number of papers study the optimal patent policy in markets with sequential innovation (Green and
Scotchmer 1995, Scotchmer 1996, ODonoghue, 1998, Besen and Maskin, 2000, Denicolo 2002). In these
models, a sequence of innovations is undertaken by di¤erent rms rather than being concentrated in one rm
and their focus is on the length and breadth of patents. Oster (1996) is the only other paper that considers
the optimal licensing scheme under sequential innovation. By way of an example, she explores the strategic
opportunities created by exclusive licensing in a research-intensive market with sequential innovations, but
contracts are short-term by assumption in her model.
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are subtle di¤erences. They implicitly assume that a technology can be transferred without
transferring all necessary know-how; our paper complements theirs by assuming that technol-
ogy know-how, once transferred, cannot be withdrawn even after the contractual relationship
ends.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I presents the environment
and assumptions of our model of innovation and licensing. In Section II, we consider a
simple example to illustrate the basic intuition. In Section III, we solve the innovators
period 2 problem. In Section IV, we nd the optimal licensing scheme in period 1 and report
comparative statics results. In Section V, we discuss the robustness of our results. Section
VI concludes. Any formal proofs omitted from the main text are contained in the appendix.
I. The Model
We consider an industry consisting of n  2 identical rms all producing the same good
with a linear cost function, C(q) = c0q, where q is the quantity produced and c0 > 0 is the
constant marginal cost of production. In addition to the n rms, there is an innovator that
engages in a series of innovations. She seeks to license the innovations to all or some of the
n rms so as to maximize her prot.
The game lasts two periods. At the beginning of period 1, the innovator owns a patent
on a cost-reducing innovation, which reduces the marginal cost of production from c0 to c1:
The patent is valid for both periods. At the beginning of period 2, the innovator can make
a further investment in R&D. If the new R&D e¤ort is successful, then it will generate a
second innovation that reduces the cost of production further to c2; hence c2 < c1 < c0:
The probability of a successful second innovation is Pr and it increases with the amount of
investment I. For ease of exposition, we assign a particular functional form to Pr(I) such
that it equals 2
p
I; where   [2M(c2)] 1:7 The innovator stops all R&D activities after
two periods and the game ends.
7This guarantees that the optimal amount of investment will be an interior solution.
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In each period, the inverse demand function of the industry is given by p = maxf0; a Qg;
where a > c0 and Q is the total production level.8 Denote by pM(c) the monopoly price in
the downstream market when the marginal cost is c; we assume that the initial innovation
is drastic, i.e., pM(c1) < c0;9 but the second innovation can be drastic or non-drastic, i.e.,
pM(c2) can be below or above c1.
In order to model technology leakage, we assume that if a downstream rm that licenses
the technology c1 in period 1 does not license any innovation in period 2, its marginal cost
of production in period 2 is c0 2 [c1; c0). According to this assumption, a licensee can retain
some fraction of the cost saving from the initial technology transfer, even if he does not
license that technology in period 2.
Our main interest is in the innovators choice of period 1 licensing contracts. We assume
that the amount of investment is not observable to outside parties; hence it cannot be
contracted upon. While it is possible to write a contract that is contingent upon the outcome
of the period 2 innovation, it costs ' to write such a contract.10 Since we do not explicitly
model the transaction cost ' and its impact on the choice of contracts is rather obvious, we
assume that ' is so large that a contingent contract is never optimal.11 Therefore, we only
consider licenses that specify the payment scheme, the number of licensees and the duration
of the contract.
8Only some of our results rely on the assumption of a linear demand, which is the most often used demand
function in the technology licensing literature. They will be clearly indicated where applicable.
The assumption of a constant market demand is for ease of exposition, but our model can be easily
extended to allow shifts in market demand across periods, as shown in Section V.C.
9In the case of a drastic innovation, the granting of an exclusive license o¤ers such a large cost advantage
that the licensee can e¤ectively monopolize the industry (Arrow, 1962). The case of non-drastic initial
innovations is discussed in Section V.
10There are a variety of reasons why conditional contracts may be even more costly. For example, there
may be search costs associated with thinking through the contractsimplications (Klein 2002) or simply ink
costs associated with writing lengthy contracts (Dye 1985). The costs become even more pronounced in an
auction setting, which necessarily involves multiple parties.
11To be more specic, it su¢ ces for ' to be greater than  (1   2)2 ; where 1 and 2 are dened in
Section III.B.a.
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In both periods, the innovator licenses her innovations to k  n rms either by a xed-
fee or by a royalty.12 The duration of a license issued in period 1 can be either one period
(short-term) or two periods (long-term). This means that there are four possible types of
licensing contracts: short-term xed fee (SF ) ; long-term xed-fee (LF ) ; short-term royalty
(SR) and long-term royalty (LR) : If the license is a long-term xed-fee contract, it species
a payment plan (f1; f2) ; where f1 and f2 are fees due at the beginning of period 1 and 2,
respectively.13 If the license is a royalty contract, then it species the royalty rate r for
each unit that a licensee sells. All individuals maximize their expected total prots, with a
common discount factor of : Our solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Here is a collection of notations that will be used throughout the paper.
pM(c) : Single-period monopoly price in the downstream market when the marginal cost
is c:
qM(c) : Single-period monopoly output in the downstream market when the marginal
cost is c:
M(c) : Single-period monopoly gross prot for the licensee who has a marginal cost of
c.
 LS(k) : Gross licensing revenue from a single-innovation game for licensing scheme LS 2
fR;FFg, where R is royalty, FF is xed-fee, and k 2 Z+ denotes the number of licensees.

LS(k)
t : The innovators gross licensing revenue at time t for licensing scheme LS 2
fSF; LF; SR;LRg and k 2 Z+ denotes the number of licensees. For notational simplicity,
we drop the superscript when doing so is unambiguous; particularly in period 2, since there
12Since contracts based on an auction are typically associated with a xed-fee payment, for conciseness,
we lump contracts based on a xed fee or an auction together and call them xed-fee contracts. In fact, since
contracts based on a xed fee are dominated by contracts based on an auction when buyers are symmetric
(Kamien and Tauman 1986, 2002, Katz and Shapiro 1986), it su¢ ces for us to consider only the latter type
of contracts and this is the approach that we have taken, except where noted, in this paper. When buyers are
asymmetric, a xed-fee policy can be more protable than an auction policy (Stamatopoulos and Tauman
2008, Miao 2009).
13By o¤ering a payment plan, the innovator gives a licensee the right to terminate the contract in period
2 without paying the second installment f2.
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are two innovation outcomes, for each licensing scheme we use 2 to denote the period 2 gross
licensing revenue if the new innovation is unsuccessful and 02 the revenue if it is successful.
II. An Example: The Period 2 Innovation is Drastic
In the standard one-innovation setting, a xed-fee license for the duration of the patent is
optimal, but this result does not extend to a model with sequential innovations. The reason
is that the innovator has an incentive to over-invest when presented with the opportunity
for new innovations; moreover, this time-consistency problem cannot be solved by a series of
short-term contracts due to technology leakage. The intuition is best illustrated by a simple
example, in which the period 2 innovation is also drastic, i.e., pM(c2) < c1: Since c0  c1;
we must have pM(c2) < c0. Hence a rm who licenses the new innovation will become an
e¤ective monopoly in period 2. This means that the innovator can sell an exclusive license
on the new innovation for a fee equal to the period 2 monopoly prot.14 To put it di¤erently,
although technology leakage may weaken the innovators bargaining position in period 2, it
has no such impact should she succeed in the new innovation. It is this feature that makes
the example particularly tractable and illustrative.
The innovators incentive to invest in the period 2 innovation is driven by the payo¤
di¤erence from the two outcomes of the innovation. The optimal level of investment is
obtained when the innovator is either vertically integrated with a downstream rm or able
to commit to an investment level in period 2 at the time when period 1 licenses are issued.
Under either of these circumstances the incentive to invest is driven by the payo¤ di¤erence
M(c2)  M(c1):
However, if the innovator is neither vertically integrated nor able to commit, then the
outcome of a successful innovation may become more attractive. Suppose that the initial
14We view exclusivity as the exclusive use of a technology, but not the exclusive position in the market,
although an exclusive license for a drastic innovation does lead to a market monopoly. This means that the
original licensee may still enjoy the exclusive use of the initial innovation, but does not necessarily maintain
its monopoly unless it gains the exclusive license to the new innovation.
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license is a standard long-term exclusive contract with an upfront fee, then the innovator
receives no income in period 2 unless the new innovation is successful. This means that her
incentive to innovate will be driven by M(c2). Therefore, the innovator has an incentive to
over-invest in period 2, relative to the investment level she would choose if she were able to
commit in period 1.
Now suppose that the initial license is a short-term xed-fee exclusive contract. The
original licensee is not willing to pay the entire monopoly prot from renewing the license
in period 2 because she will enjoy some of the cost savings from the innovation even if she
does not renew the license. Further, her possession of the leaked technology means that no
other rm will be willing to pay the entire monopoly prot. Thus, the innovator is unable to
receive the entire monopoly prot as licensing revenue in period 2. Let the revenue loss from
leakage be 1; the innovators incentive to innovate will be driven by M(c2)  [M(c1)  1]:
Therefore, the innovator still has an incentive to over-invest in period 2, but the degree of
over-investment is smaller.
This example gives us the basic intuition why a short-term xed-fee contract may be
preferred to a long-term xed fee contract and why neither contract can achieve the rst-
best outcome. In the standard long-term xed-fee contract with upfront payments, the
innovator faces a classic time-consistency problem (Coasian 1972): Once a license is sold,
the innovator is then tempted to invest in new technologies that render the initial license
obsolete; expecting this, rms will pay less for the license. At the same time, a short-
term contract entails technology leakage; so the innovator has an incentive to choose an
investment level to minimize the negative impact of technology leakage, but this investment
level generally deviates from the optimal.
Of course, the above analysis is far from complete. Clearly, the innovator may want to
structure a contract that deals with the time-consistency problem. Since the initial license
will be worthless once the period 2 innovation succeeds, a possible solution is to use an
installment payment plan, in which the second installment is paid only if a licensee wishes
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to continue the contract. It is easy to see that the second installment has to be as high
as M(c1) in order for the innovator to overcome her excessive incentive to invest, but for
a payment this high the original licensee will terminate the contract even if the period 2
innovation fails. In other words, a long-term contract that stipulates an opt-out clause with
a high continuation fee e¤ectively becomes a short-term contract, which may alleviate the
time-consistency problem but not eliminate it. This and other points will be discussed in
more detail when we solve the complete model.
III. Investment and Licensing in Period 2
We solve the game via backward induction. In this section, we consider the innovators
period 2 problem. We rst nd the optimal licensing scheme under a cost asymmetry. It
allows us to more precisely dene the cost of technology leakage. We then derive the optimal
investment level at the beginning of period 2.
A. Licensing Under Cost Asymmetry
In period 2, downstream rms are no longer identical in their pre-licensing costs. Licensees
of the initial innovation will have lower marginal costs than non-licensees, either because the
former has signed long-term contracts or because of technology leakage. Here we focus on
a particular scenario, in which an exclusive license is granted in period 1 so that the period
2 cost asymmetry is between the original licensee and all others. We show that the optimal
licensing scheme under such a cost asymmetry is to once again issue a xed-fee exclusive
license to the original licensee.
Lemma 1 Suppose that rm 1 has a cost of ca and the other n   1 rms have a cost of c,
where ca  c: If an innovation allows a rm to produce at a cost of cb; where pM (cb) < c;
then it is optimal to issue an exclusive license to rm 1 for a xed fee via a Right of First
O¤er.
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Proof. Suppose that an optimal licensing scheme S exists, in which rm 1s net prot
(prot minus the payment for a license) is 0. Since the industry prots are no larger than
M(cb); the innovators licensing revenue cannot be greater than M(cb)  0 under scheme
S: Now consider an alternative scheme, in which an exclusive contract is o¤ered for a xed-
fee of M(cb)   0 and rm 1 is given the Right of First O¤er: if rm 1 accepts, then the
game ends; if rm 1 rejects, then the innovator uses scheme S to sell the innovation. Since
pM (cb) < c; rm 1 will be able to earn the monopoly prot if it gets the exclusive license.
Therefore, in the subgame perfect equilibrium, rm 1 accepts the o¤er and the innovator
receives M(cb) 0 as her revenue. This means that a xed-fee exclusive contract is at least
as protable as scheme S and is therefore optimal.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. O¤ering an exclusive license to rm 1
ensures that the market continues to be monopolized so that the industry prots are shared
just between the innovator and rm 1. After leaving rm 1 a surplus that it could have
earned otherwise, the innovator keeps all the gain in the industry prots. In such as case,
any licensing scheme that maximizes the industry prots also maximizes the innovators
payo¤. But Lemma 1 does not always hold if pM (cb) > c:15 It is our assumption that
the initial innovation is drastic and thus any improvement upon the initial innovation is
also drastic against the old technology that allows us to dwell on this case, which greatly
simplies our task.
B. The Cost of Technology Leakage
A prominent feature of our model is technology leakage in short-term contracts. Because of
technology leakage, the innovator may obtain a smaller licensing revenue in period 2 than
she would if the technology transfer were reversible. This loss in licensing revenue is the cost
of technology leakage.
15For example, in a duopoly, if the high cost rm obtaining a new technology leads to a higher industry
prot than the low cost one obtaining the same technology, then it is optimal to license the technology to
the former (Stamatopoulos and Tauman 2008).
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Denition 1 The cost of technology leakage for an innovator is the di¤erence between the
licensing revenue she earns in case past licensees retain some of the cost savings, and the
licensing revenue in case they do not.
In order to nd the cost of technology leakage, one compares the innovators licensing
revenues with and without leakage, which, in general, is not an easy task. However, the
comparison in this model is made simpler by the assumption that the initial innovation is
drastic. Due to this assumption and the fact that the period 2 innovation is necessarily an
improvement over the initial one, without technology leakage the innovator can always sell
an exclusive license in period 2 for a fee equal to the monopoly prots. In other words,
the period 2 licensing revenue without leakage is M(c2) if the period 2 innovation succeeds
or M(c1) if it fails. Therefore, the cost of technology leakage is either M(c2)   02 or
M(c1)  2.
a. Technology Leakage From an Exclusive License
Moreover, if an exclusive license was issued in period 1, then the cost of technology leakage
is exactly equal to the prot that the original licensee can earn in period 2. This is because,
according to Lemma 1, it is optimal to o¤er a second exclusive license to the original licensee
so that the innovator and the original licensee split the monopoly prots in period 2. This
means that any gain in the bargaining power of the original licensee directly translates into
the innovators loss of revenue. It is this linkage that allows us to further quantify the cost
of technology leakage based on the latters prot in this special, but important case, of our
model.
The cost of the technology leakage not only depends on the amount of cost saving, but
also the technologies available to rms that it competes with. Suppose that rm 1 has a cost
of ca and the other n 1 rms have a cost of c  pM(cb) before a new technology that lowers
the cost to cb is introduced by the innovator. Denote by  (ca; cb) rm 1s net prots (prots
minus the licensing fee) from licensing the new technology cb. The cost of technology leakage
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if the period 2 innovation fails can thus be written as 1 =  (c0; c1). Similarly, the cost of
technology leakage if the period 2 innovation succeeds is 2 =  (c0; c2) : In addition, we nd
the value of owning an exclusive license to the initial innovation in period 2 in the event of
a successful period 2 innovation to be another important variable. Using the notation just
introduced, we can write it as l =  (c1; c2) :
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions on the costs of technology
leakage:
Assumption 1 If ca < pM(cb); then  (ca; cb) > 0; if ca  pM(cb); then  (ca; cb) = 0:
Assumption 2 l < M(c1):
Assumption 3 1   2 < M(c1)  l:
Assumption 1 states that the cost of technology leakage is zero if and only if cb is drastic
against ca, i.e., the availability of the new technology renders the leaked technology obsolete.
Assumption 2 states that the value of having an exclusive access to a production technology
of c1 cannot exceed the monopoly prot earned with that technology. Assumption 3 further
narrows down the range of the costs of technology leakage. In Appendix B, we verify that
these assumptions are met in homogeneous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models. In
Appendix C, we consider more general models in which some of these assumption are not
met.
One may wonder whether 2 is always smaller than 1, since the leakage appears to be
less of a concern should the period 2 innovation succeed. The answer is no, due to the integer
constraint in the number of licenses that the innovator can sell in period 2. As shown in
Appendix B, if the original licensee refuses the o¤er of an exclusive license, then the innovator
will auction either 1 or 2 licenses in stage 2 of the period 2 licensing game. For a xed ca;
when cb is close to ca; 2 is the optimal number of licenses to sell in stage 2; when cb decreases,
the optimal number of licenses to sell in stage 2 will also decrease and at some point that
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number will "jump" from 2 to 1, diminishing the threat that can be imposed on the original
licensee. It is this discontinuity in the number of licenses that causes the non-monotonicity
in the cost of technology leakage, because of which we cannot rule out the possibility that
1 < 2:
C. The Investment Decision and the Value of Investment
Now we solve the innovators problem at the investment stage in period 2. Let  = 02 2,
we have
Lemma 2 The optimal amount of investment is 2; the probability of a successful innova-
tion is 2; and the innovators expected prot in period 2 is 2 + 2.
Proof. The innovators investment decision is maxI Pr (I)   I = 2
p
I   I: Hencep
=I = 1; i.e., I = 2: So Pr (I) = 2 and the expected prot in period 2 is
2 + Pr (I
)  I = 2 + 2:16
Lemma 2 shows that the innovators incentive to invest in period 2 is entirely determined
by; the di¤erence in period 2 licensing revenues from the two outcomes. Hence,  can serve
as a convenient indicator of a licensing schemes optimality, which we will use repeatedly in
this paper. Another result that allows us to easily compare licensing schemes is the following:
Lemma 3 The innovators expected prot in period 2 increases in both 2 and 02:
Proof. The innovators expected prot in period 2 ismaxI 2+Pr(I) (02   2) I:Denote it
by 2: By the envelope theorem, d

2=d2 =
@
@2
(Pr(I) (02   2)  I) jI=I = 1 Pr(I)  0
and d2=d
0
2 = Pr(I)  0:
16Because of the earlier assumption that p < [2M (c2)] 1; this probability will fall between 0 and 1.
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IV. Licensing in Period 1
In this section, we nd the optimal licensing scheme in period 1, which is the central concern
of this paper. We start with the rst-best scenario for the innovator, whose solution is then
used as our benchmark. Then we solve for the payo¤s associated with each of the possible
licensing schemes. We compare them with the benchmark and discuss each schemes advan-
tages/disadvantages. Finally, we carry out some comparative statics exercises by varying
the rate of innovation parameter and the cost of technology leakage.
A. The Benchmark
In a rst-best scenario, the innovator is vertically integrated with a downstream rm and
sells the nal output by herself. There is neither a commitment problem nor technology
leakage. Since pM(c2) < pM(c1) < c0, the innovator can monopolize the industry in both
periods.17 Therefore, her incentive to innovate in period 2 is perfectly aligned with the gain
in industry prots, which is M(c2)  M(c1).
Proposition 1 If the innovator markets the nal output by herself, then  = M(c2)  
M(c1) and
(1)  = (1 + )M(c1) + [M(c2)  M(c1)]2:
Proposition 1 gives us the upper bound of licensing revenue that the innovator can obtain,
which serves as a useful benchmark in comparing di¤erent licensing schemes. It also provides
a necessary condition for any licensing scheme to generate the benchmark prots:  =
02   2 must be equal to  = M(c2)   M(c1): This is true because the optimal level of
investment is proportional to 2, so the period 2 investment must be ine¢ cient if  deviates
from .
17This also means that an innovator who is an incumbent in the industry will not license either innovation
in our model.
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Vertical integration is not the only way for the innovator to obtain the benchmark prot.
If the transaction cost, '; is zero, then the benchmark outcome can also be achieved via a
xed-fee license whose payments are contingent upon the innovation outcome. Denote by
f1 the period 1 license fee, f2 (f 02) the period 2 license fee if the period 2 innovation fails
(succeeds).
Proposition 2 A long-term xed-fee exclusive contract with f1 = M(c1); f2 = M(c1) and
f 02 = 
M(c2) replicates the benchmark outcome if and only if ' = 0:
In reality, however, both vertical integration and writing complete contracts may be im-
practical: a research university may want to keep armslength from the product market in
order to avoid conicts of interest; certain transaction costsmay prevent future contingen-
cies from being contracted ex ante. Therefore, we must also examine the optimal licensing
scheme when the above two options are unavailable.
B. Fixed-fee Licenses
We rst consider xed-fee licenses. Since we assume that the initial innovation is drastic,
a xed-fee exclusive license is optimal in an one-innovation model (Katz and Shapiro 1986,
Kamien and Tauman 1986), but we show in this section that it is generally not true when
there are sequential innovations and technology leakage. In so doing, we also solve for
the optimal xed-fee contracts. To streamline our exposition, we restrict our attention
to exclusive contracts in period 1. We will verify in Section V. that this restriction is
inconsequential.
a. Short-term Fixed-Fee Exclusive License
In a short-term xed-fee exclusive contract, a licensee has the right to use the cost-reducing
technology of c1 for just one period, during which he earns the monopoly prot M(c1).
After the contract expires at the end of period 1, the original licensee enjoys a cost of c0 < c0
17
because of technology leakage, while the other n   1 rms only have the old technology of
c0. In period 2, new licensing takes place regardless of whether the innovator is successful in
her R&D e¤orts.
Lemma 4 If a short-term xed-fee exclusive license is o¤ered in period 1, then SF =
    (1   2)2 ; if c0 > pM (c1) ; then 1 = 2 = 0 and a short-term xed-fee exclusive
license replicates the benchmark outcome.
Proof. According to Lemma 1, the period 2 license will be granted to the original licensee,
who will gain a monopoly, regardless of the innovation outcome. Thus 2 = M(c1)   1
and 02 = 
M(c2)   2: Hence, I = [M(c2)   M(c1) + 1   2]2; SF2 = M(c1)   1 +

 
M(c2)  M(c1) + 1   2
2
and SF1 = 
M(c1) +  (1  Pr) 1 +  Pr 2; where Pr =
2
 
M(c2)  M(c1) + 1   2

: Therefore,
SF = (1 + )M(c1)  2 (1   2) 
 
M(c2)  M(c1) + 1   2

+ 
 
M(c2)  M(c1) + 1   2
2(2)
=     (1   2)2 :
(3)
If c0 > pM (c1) ; then 1 = 2 = 0 by Assumption 1 hence SF = . It is also easy to verify
that the innovator will choose the optimal investment level [M(c2)   M(c1)]2 if she has
the ability to commit in period 1.
If the game lasts only one period, then the standard model predicts that a xed-fee license
is optimal (Kamien and Tauman 1986). Upon rst glance of our model, extending the game
into two periods adds little new: the innovator and potential licensees can contract period by
period and this reduces a two-period game into two one-period standard games. However,
Lemma 4 tells us that the benchmark outcome can be replicated by a series of short-term
contracts only if there is no technology leakage, otherwise technology leakage will cost the
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innovator  (1   2)2 ; where 1   2 represents the di¤erence in the costs of technology
leakage between the two outcomes of the period 2 innovation.
It should be noted that the innovators period 2 revenue loss from technology leakage does
not directly translate into a loss in total licensing revenue: after all, expecting a leakage,
rms will pay more for the initial license. Rather, it is the innovators attempt to minimize
the revenue loss from leakage that causes a distortion in her incentive to invest in sequential
innovations and this lowers a licensees willingness to pay for the initial innovation. It can
be seen most clearly by examining  = 02   2; which equals M(c2)  M(c1) + (1   2)
under a short-term contract. Thus, as long as the costs of technology leakage are not identical
under di¤erent innovation outcomes, the innovators incentive to invest will deviate from the
optimal level. It is this deviation that results in the innovators loss in total revenue. In
other words, the presence of both technology leakage and sequential innovation are essential
for short-term xed-fee contracts not to be able to replicate the benchmark outcome.
b. Long-term Fixed-fee Exclusive License
Now we examine in detail long-term xed-fee contracts and their optimality. In our simple
example, only contracts with an upfront payment are considered and we nd that long-
term xed-fee contracts entail a time-consistency problem. To deal with the problem, the
innovator may choose to add an opt-out clause, which allows a licensee to terminate a long-
term contract after the innovation outcome is realized in period 2. More specically, the
period 1 contract species the fees to be paid in each of the two periods and we denote them
by f1 and f2; if a licensee opts out the contract in period 2, then the contract terminates
and f2 will not be paid.18 ;19
18Here we implicitly assume a zero termination fee, but this assumption is without loss of generality,
since only the di¤erence in the payments a¤ects a licensees decision whether to continue or to terminate
the contract and the innovators incentive to invest in a new innovation. If the contract instead species a
non-zero termination fee of f 02, then such a contract is equivalent to (f1 + f
0
2; f2   f 02).
19A contract with an opt-out clause can be implemented via an auction, in which the innovator rst
announces the period 2 payment f2 and then invites bids such that the winning bid becomes the period 1
payment f1.
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Clearly, a long-term xed-fee contract (f1; f2) without the opt-out clause is equivalent
to a long-term xed-fee contract (f1 + f2; 0) with the opt-out clause. This means that any
long-term xed-fee contracts without the opt-out clause are just special cases of a long-term
xed-fee contract with an opt-out clause. Therefore, it su¢ ces to nd the optimal long-term
xed-fee contract with an opt-out clause.
Lemma 5 In a long-term xed-fee exclusive contract (f1; f2) with an opt-out clause, if 1 
2 > 0 and f2  M(c1)  1; then LF increases with f2:
Proof. In period 2, there are two states of nature: (i) innovation is not successful; (ii)
innovation is successful. In case (i) ; since M(c1) f2 > 1; the original licensee will continue
the contract and get M(c1)  f2: Hence 2 = f2:
In case (ii) ; we separate f2 further into two regions: a) f2  l  2 and b) l  2 < f2 <
M(c1)  1:
(ii:a) f2  l  2: If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at a
cost of c1, then he gets l f2; if he opts out, then he gets 2. Since l f2  2; it is optimal
for the original licensee to continue the original license. This means that 02 = 
M(c2) l+f2
and  = M(c2)  l: So the innovators incentive to invest is independent of f2: Therefore,
her licensing revenue is a constant if f2  l   2.
(ii:b) f2 > l  2: If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at a
cost of c1, then he gets l  f2; if he opts out, then he gets 2. Since l  f2 < 2; the original
licensees right to use the old innovation has no value and he will opt out the initial contract.
This means that 02 = 
M(c2)  2 and  = M(c2)  2 f2: In period 1, a rm is willing to
pay LF1 = 
M(c1)+(1 2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

)
 
M (c1)  f2

+2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

2
for an exclusive license. At the same time, LF2 = f2 + 
 
M (c2)  2   f2
2
: Hence,
the total licensing revenue is LF = M(c1) + (1  2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

)
 
M (c1)  f2

+
2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

2+ 

f2 + 
 
M (c2)  2   f2
2
, so @
@f2
LF = 2
 
M (c1)  2   f2
 
2 (1   2) > 0: Last, it is also easy to verify that LF is continuous at f2 = l   2:
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Lemma 6 If 1  2 > 0; then any equilibrium long-term xed-fee exclusive contract (f1; f2)
with an opt-out clause and f2  M(c1)  1 is equivalent to a short-term exclusive contract
with a xed fee of f1:
Proof. If the period 2 innovation is not successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original
licensee can obtain is M(c1)   f2 by continuing the contract and 1 by opting out. Since
1  M(c1)  f2; the contract will be terminated after period 1.
If the period 2 innovation is successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original licensee
can obtain is l   f2 by continuing the initial contract and 2 by opting out. Since l   f2 <
l + 1   M(c1) < 2; the initial contract will also be terminated after period 1.
Lemma 7 If 1   2 < 0; then there exists a long-term xed-fee exclusive contract that
replicates the benchmark outcome.
Proof. Consider a long-term xed-fee contract (f1; f2) with f1 = M(c1) + 2 and f2 =
M(c1)  2:
If the period 2 innovation is not successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original
licensee can obtain is M(c1)   f2 = 2 by continuing the contract and 1 by opting out.
Since 1 < 2; the contract will be continued after period 1 and thus the original licensee is
willing to pay f1 = M(c1) + 2 in period 1. Also, we obtain that 2 = f2 = M(c1)  2:
If the period 2 innovation is successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original licensee
can obtain is l f2 by continuing the initial contract and 2 by opting out. Since l M(c1)+
2 < 2; the initial contract will be terminated after period 1 and the original licensees period
2 surplus is 2. This again means that the original licensee is willing to pay M(c1) + 2 in
period 1, so we obtain that 02 = 
M(c2)  2:
Since  = 02  2 = M(c2)  M(c1); the innovators incentive to invest in period 2 is
optimal. Therefore, the given contract replicates the benchmark outcome.
Using the above lemmas, we obtain the following result for xed-fee contracts.
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Proposition 3 For homogeneous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models, (i) If 1 2 
0; then there exists a long-term xed-fee contract that replicates the benchmark outcome; (ii)
if 1   2 > 0; then a short-term contract is optimal among xed-fee licenses.
The intuition for the above result is easy to understand. As shown in the simple example,
in a long-term xed-fee contract, the innovator has an incentive to over-invest in order to
make the initial license obsolete. To mitigate this incentive, the innovator can increase
f2; the continuation fee on the initial license. But too high a continuation fee will lead
the original licensee to terminate the initial contract regardless of the innovation outcome,
replicating a short-term contract. Hence f2 can not exceed M(c1)   1. On the other
hand, the continuation fee that allows the innovator to replicate the benchmark outcome is
M(c1)   2: The two conditions can both be met only if M(c1)   2: < M(c1)   1; i.e.,
1 < 2;
20 otherwise a long-term xed-fee contract is at best as protable as a short-term
one.
As shown in the proof, the optimal xed-fee contract depends on comparing the costs
of technology leakage, especially 1   2 and M(c1)   l: In homogenous good, conjectural
variation models, we have Assumption 2 and 3, which signicantly reduce the number of
cases to consider. For more general models, the results are analogous, but the proof are
somewhat tedious, so we leave them in the appendix.
C. Royalty Licenses
Next we consider the optimality of short-term and long-term royalty licensing schemes. We
will use a result attributed to Kamien and Tauman (1986): in a one-innovation licensing
game, under Cournot competition with a linear demand, the licensing revenue from royalty
 R(k)(r) on a drastic innovation that reduces the production cost from c0 to c1 is maximized
20It should also be noted that the continuation fee does not have to be positive. In fact, if M (c1) < 2,
then the optimal continuation fee will be negative; or to put it di¤erently, the continuation fee will be greater
than the termination fee.
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at r = (a  c1) =2 and k = n for a maximum of  R(r) = nn+1M(c1); under Bertrand
competition,  R(r) = M(c1):
a. Short-term Royalty
Like a short-term xed-fee license, short-term royalty contracts last only one period, but
they generally admit more licensees in period 1. Hence, in period 2, more than one rms
may have access to the part of cost saving that is irreversible. This makes an explicit solution
to the period 2 licensing game di¢ cult to obtain. Therefore, we simply compare the two
licensing schemes and rule out short-term royalty as a possible optimal scheme.
Lemma 8 Short-term royalty is less protable than short-term xed-fee exclusive licensing.
Proof. Recall that the innovators total licensing revenue net of investment is  = 1 +
2 + (
0
2   2)2: Our plan of the proof is to show that all three terms, 1;2 and 02,
are lower under short-term royalty (SR) than under short-term xed-fee exclusive licensing
(SF ) and therefore the same must be true for  according to Lemma 3.
First, it is easy to see that SR1  M(c1)  SF1 : Next we consider period 2 licensing if
the innovation fails so that the best technology available remains c1. Because of technology
leakage, k1  1 rms have a cost of c0 at the beginning of period 2 under SR but only 1 rm
has c0 under SF: All other rms have a cost of c0 > c0:
Let the period 2 optimal licensing scheme under SR be O. We want to show that under
SF a scheme based on O can give the innovator a period 2 licensing revenue at least as much
as SR2 : Consider scheme O
+, under which scheme O is used along with a royalty contract
o¤ered to k1   1 rms that allows them to use the cost-reducing technology c1 for a rate of
c0  c1. For the k1  1 rms o¤ered a royalty, their cost e¤ectively becomes c1+ r = c0: Thus,
in total, k1 of rms will have a cost of c0 when they participate in scheme O: This means
that scheme O+ allows period 2 licensing under SF to replicate the licensing game played
under scheme O and therefore  O
+  SR2 ; where the inequality holds if the royalty o¤er is
23
taken by a positive number of rms. Since O+ is not necessarily the optimal scheme under
SF , we must have SF2   O+ and therefore SF2  SR2 : The same argument, except that
the royalty rate should be set at c0   c2; can be applied to the case of a successful period 2
innovation to show that 02 is lower under SR than under SF:
The intuition behind the proof goes as follows: when compared with short-term xed-fee
licensing, short-term royalty generates a smaller period 1 licensing revenue and leads to a
greater degree of technology leakage, which lowers the licensing revenue in period 2 regardless
of the innovation outcome. In particular, under a xed-fee contract the innovator is able to
capture a licensees gain from technology leakage, whereas under a royalty the innovator is
unable to. This, however, suggests that a two-part tari¤ can potentially improve upon pure
royalty, an observation that we will return to in Section V.
b. Long-term Royalty
Under a long-term royalty scheme, a licensee is entitled to use the period 1 innovation of c1
for both periods and pay r1 (reps. r2) for every unit of output produced in period 1 (reps. 2).
Here we allow the royalty rate to change because the optimal royalty rate varies with market
demand, which may be di¤erent across periods. However, in the constant demand case we
consider in this model the two royalty rates coincide. More importantly, they are shown to
be the same as the royalty rate that maximizes revenue in a one-innovation licensing game.
Lemma 9 Under Cournot competition with linear demand, the optimal royalty rate in both
periods is r = (a  c1) =2 in a long-term royalty contract and the licensing revenue is LR =
(1 + )  R(r)+
 
M(c2)   R(r)
2
; under Bertrand competition, the optimal royalty rate
in both periods is r = (a  c1) =2 in a long-term royalty contract and the licensing revenue
is LR = :
Proof. If the period 2 innovation is not successful, then2 =  R(r2). HenceLR =(1 + )  R(r2)+

 
02    R(r2)
2
. In order to nd the optimal royalty rate in period 2, we separate the pos-
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sible choice of r2 into two regions: (i) r2  r or (ii) r2 < r; where r = (a  c1) =2 is the
optimal royalty rate in a one-innovation licensing game.
(i) If r2  r; then the period 2 innovation c2 is drastic against an original licensees
total cost c1 + r2; since pM(c2) < pM(c1)  c1 + r2. Therefore, if the period 2 innovation is
successful, then the licensing revenue from it is maximized via a xed-fee exclusive license.
This means that 02 = 
M(c2) and LR =  R(r1) +  R(r2) + 
 
M(c2)   R(r2)
2
. We
can see that the innovators total prots LR increases with  R(r2); since
(4)
@
@ R(r2)
LR = [1  2(M(c2)   R(r2)]  0:
Therefore, r2 should be chosen so as to maximize  R(r2); i.e., r2 = r: Thus,
(5) LR = (1 + )  R(r) + 
 
M(c2)   R(r)
2
:
(ii) In order for r2 < r to be a protable deviation from r, we must have  R(r2) +

 
02    R(r2)
2
>  R(r)+
 
M(c2)   R(r)
2
and02 >  
R(r2): But  R(r)+
 
M(c2)   R(r)
2 
 R(r2) + 
 
M(c2)   R(r2)
2   R(r2) +   02    R(r2)2 ; a contradiction. The rst in-
equality is due to Eq. (4) and the second is due to 02  M(c2):
Under Bertrand competition,  R(r) = M(c1) hence LR = :
Royalty contracts generally cannot replicate the benchmark outcome under Cournot com-
petition. In standard one-innovation models, they are inferior to contracts based on a xed
fee or an auction. But in a model with sequential innovations, a long-term royalty con-
tract can avoid both the technology leakage problem in a short-term contract and the time-
consistency problem in a xed-fee contract. Intuitively, the use of royalty to collect payments
on an ongoing basis eliminates the innovators commitment problem. It is this advantage
that makes royalty a potentially optimal licensing scheme.
It should be noted that the licensing revenue obtained in Eq. (5) is likely to be the
lower bound for a long-term royalty contract. If renegotiations are allowed, the innova-
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tor can potentially increase her revenue. For example, in the above discussion, we have
implicitly assumed that the innovator cannot change the licensing scheme for the period
1 innovation in period 2 if the new innovation is not successful. Now suppose that the
innovator can modify licensing contracts with individual licensees, then it is optimal to
move from the royalty scheme to a xed-fee exclusive licensing in period 2. This change
will increase the period 2 licensing revenue without a¤ecting the period 1 royalty rate
and thus may increase the innovators total prots. Under Cournot competition, it can be
shown that the innovators total revenue will then become  R(r) + 

1  1
(n+1)2

M(c1) +


M(c2) 

1  1
(n+1)2

M(c1)
2
; which is greater than LR obtained in Eq.(5) ; since
 R(r) = n
n+1
M(c1) <

1  1
(n+1)2

M(c1):
D. Summary of results and Comparative Statics
Now we summarize the comparison of di¤erent licensing schemes and discuss how the choice
of licensing schemes varies with the model parameters. In so doing, we also provide some
potential testable hypotheses, which can serve as guidance for future empirical work.
Proposition 4 Under Cournot competition with linear demand, (i) If 1   2 < 0; then
the optimal licensing contract is a long-term xed-fee contract with an opt-out clause, where
LF = ; (ii) if 1   2 > 0, then the optimal licensing contract is either SF or LR;
where SF =     (1   2)2 and LR = (1 + )  R(r) + 
 
M(c2)   R(r)
2
; which
approaches  when n!1: Under Bertrand competition, the optimal licensing contract is
a long-term royalty with LR = :
For any xed-fee contract, short-term or long-term, the payo¤ of the innovator stays the
same for any size of oligopoly and is bounded away from the benchmark prot, but the payo¤
from a long-term royalty always increases in n; the size of the oligopoly, and can be made
arbitrarily close to the benchmark prot by increasing n: Therefore, even in the absence
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of information asymmetry and risk aversion, royalty licensing can be more protable than
xed-fee contracts when the size of the oligopoly is su¢ ciently large.21
Corollary 1 Denote by ~n the size of the oligopoly such that LR = SF and A = M(c2)=M(c1):
Under Cournot competition with linear demand, @~n=@ < 0:
Proof. From Proposition 4, we get
@
@
~n =   (n+ 1)  1 + 2 (n+ 1) (A  1) + (1   2)2 (n+ 1)2 = ((n+ 1) (1 +    2A) + 2n) <
0:
When we vary the parameter governing the probability of innovation, we nd that non-
exclusive royalty contracts are optimal for higher levels of innovation. The reason is that
increasing the rate of innovation magnies the innovators incentive to engage in R&D,
thereby exacerbating the over-investment problem under xed-fee contracts. This suggests
that industries where sequential innovations are common are more likely to use non-exclusive
royalty contracts. Although there is no direct evidence to support this prediction, Anand
and Khanna (2000) do nd that the incidence of exclusivity varies considerably across in-
dustries.22 Exclusive transfers are much less common in Computers (18%) and Electronics
(16%), two industries that are well known for sequential innovations (Bessen 2004, Bessen
and Maskin 2000), than in the other industries (38%).
Our model also suggests that short-term exclusive contracts may be more likely used
in industries that have strong intellectual property protection so that technology leakage
is of little concern. This hypothesis is also compatible with the above pattern of licensing
observed by Anand and Khanna: the chemical industries have high invent-around costs,
patents deliver strong appropriability (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al. 2000), and these
industries also have higher incidences of exclusive licensing than computers and electronics
industries, which have low invent-around costs and patents that deliver low appropriability.
21Sen (2005) uses the same bounds approach to show that royalty licensing can be superior to both xed
fee and auction in a one-innovation setting due to the integer constraint on the number of licensees.
22They have not been able to gather reliable information on the form of payment (royalties versus xed
fees) agreed to in the licensing contracts.
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Further research, however, is needed to identify which of the two factors is more responsible
for the observed pattern.
V. Discussion
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of relaxing some of our assumptions made in the basic
model. Our results appear robust to these extensions.
A. Multiple Fixed-Fee Licenses
For ease of exposition, we only allowed the innovator to sell an exclusive xed-fee license on
the initial innovation in the main results. Here we consider the possibility that the innovator
sells multiple xed-fee licenses in period 1. First, if these licenses are short-term, then their
optimality will not change our results. Second, if these licenses are long-term, then the
industry prots in period 2 will be lower than the monopoly prot if the new innovation
is not successful; in itself, it lowers the innovators potential licensing revenue; at the same
time, it also creates incentive for the innovator to over-invest. In the appendix, we prove
that issuing multiple long-term xed-fee licenses is never optimal in our model.
B. Non-drastic Innovation
Our current analysis has been limited to drastic innovations in period 1. If the innovation
in period 1 is not drastic, then it may no longer be optimal to o¤er an exclusive license in
period 1.23 Instead, a xed-fee license may be o¤ered to multiple rms, either as a long-term
contract or a short-term contract. A detailed analysis will be complicated and is beyond the
scope of this paper.24 However, the basic trade-o¤between the value of the initial innovation
and the incentive to engage in future innovations remains the same. More importantly, we
23In Kamien and Tauman (1986), it has been shown that a xed-fee license sold to multiple rms is optimal
in a one-period game if the innovation is not drastic.
24The major complication involves solving the period 2 competition outcome with four di¤erent types of
rms, whose marginal costs can be any of c0; c1; c2 and c0.
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nd that short-term royalty is never optimal even if the period 1 innovation is non-drastic,
as shown in the appendix, while short-term xed-fee licensing can be optimal when there
is no technology leakage. Therefore, we expect our result that royalties on average have a
longer duration than xed-fee contracts to continue to hold.
C. Shifts in Market Demand
Another possibility that we want to consider is the change in the size of the market across
two periods. As long as the period 2 demand is common knowledge, our results do not
change qualitatively. Under both short-term and long-term xed-fee schemes, the innovator
is able to extract the entire period 1 monopoly prot as her licensing revenue. Therefore, the
size of the period 1 monopoly prot does not a¤ect the comparison between short-term and
long-term xed-fee contracts. Royalty contracts are slightly more complicated, since they
involve a trade-o¤ between resolving the time-consistency problem in period 2 and lowering
licensing revenue in period 1, but it is not di¢ cult to see that royalties are more likely to be
used when the market demand is larger in period 2.
One trivial exception is the possibility of delayed licensing, i.e. the innovator can choose
not to o¤er any license in period 1 and only o¤er licenses after the outcome of the period
2 innovation is realized. Such a delay allows the innovator to get the same expected net
prot in period 2 as in the benchmark case, though she loses the monopoly prots in period
1. Clearly, if the market demand in period 2 is su¢ ciently large relative to the period 1
demand, then delayed licensing can be optimal. In the case of constant market demand
delayed licensing is not optimal, since the revenue loss from delayed licensing is M(c1) and
we have M(c1) > [M(c1)]2=[2M(c2)]  
 
M(c1)
2    M(c1)  l2 ; where the last
term is the revenue loss from a long-term xed-fee contract with an upfront payment.
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D. Two-part Tari¤
In this model, the licensing policies are conned to either pure xed fees or pure royalty.
Here we discuss what happens if the innovator can use two-part tari¤s, i.e., a combination of
xed fees and royalties, as a possible payment scheme.25 Since both xed fee and royalty are
special cases of the more general licensing scheme, the innovator cannot do worse by having
the ability to use the combination of the two. The question is therefore about which existing
licensing scheme can be improved by its combination with the other. First, it is clear that
any pure xed-fee contracts cannot be improved by adding a positive royalty, for otherwise
the fee currently set could not have been optimal; second, royalty contracts can potentially
become more protable since the innovator can use the xed-fee part of a two-part tari¤ to
extract licenseesprots. Thus, allowing two-part tari¤s increases the circumstances under
which contracts with positive royalty rates are used. In fact, Vishwasrao (2007) nds that
contracts of longer duration are generally associated with a combination of fees and royalties
rather than royalties alone. Our model provides a useful starting point to understand her
empirical nding.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the literature on technology licensing by adding to the
literature on the duration of contracts, sequential innovations and a model of technology
leakage. We show in this framework that it may be optimal for the innovator to limit
the length of xed-fee licenses to less than that of the underlying patent. We nd that long-
term, but not short-term, royalty contracts can be optimal, even under complete information
and risk neutrality, because they allow the innovator to resolve a time-consistency problem
caused by sequential innovation and technology leakage. This implies that royalty contracts
25A two-part tari¤ can be implemented via an auction plus royalty policy where the innovator rst an-
nounces the level of royalty and then auctions o¤ one or more licenses so that the upfront fee that a licensee
pays is its winning bid (Sen and Tauman 2007).
30
are on average of longer duration than xed-fee contracts, a result generally consistent with
empirical ndings.
It has long been recognized that the market of technology licensing is imperfect (e.g.,
Caves, Crookell and Killing 1983). While other papers in the literature of technology licens-
ing have dwelt on incomplete information, moral hazard, risk and uncertainty, our paper
focuses on the irreversibility of technology transfer and the incentive to engage in sequential
innovations. In particular, we introduce the notion of technology leakage, which is shown to
be an important determinant in an innovators choice of licensing contracts. Nonetheless, it
remains an under-explored topic, which we believe will lead to fruitful researches.
The model presented here has made strong assumptions that can potentially relaxed.
First, one may examine whether our results extend beyond the articial two-period model.
Second, in our model, technology leakage is studied in detail only when one rm has a cost
advantage over other rms hence an exclusive license is the best form of contract. It can
be challenging yet worthwhile to quantify technology leakage in more general cases. On a
related point, the optimal contract when there is cost asymmetry among potential licensees
deserves more attention in the literature.26 Third, one can extend the analysis by allowing
more general licensing schemes, including two-part tari¤s. Last, we have contented ourselves
with a positive analysis, but new and interesting questions will arise in a normative analysis.
These questions are left for future research.
26Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996, 2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) include models of
licensing to asymmetric rms, but there is only one license which may be sold to a single buyer. Hoppe,
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) considers a game in which multiple licenses are auctioned, but they impose
restrictions on paramater values that are not always satised in our model. Bagchi (2007) analyzes the
optimal licensing mechanism when a buyer can make bids for multiple licenses, but the equilibrium he
considers is not subgame-perfect.
31
A Proofs
Proposition 5 If the period 1 innovation is drastic, then any long-term xed-fee contract
with k  2 licensees in period 1 cannot be optimal.
Proof. Under Cournot competition with linear demand, if k  2 long-term licenses are sold
in period 1 for a xed fee, then the period 2 industry prots will be at most 8M (c1) =9
if the new innovation fails, since D(c1) = 4M (c1) =9: This means that the total licens-
ing revenue will be at most M(c1) + 

A+ (M (c2)  A)2

where A = 8M (c1) =9: It is
less than the benchmark prot  by 
 
M(c1)  A
 

 
M(c1) + A

+
 
1  2M (c2)
 

 
M(c1)  A
  
M(c1) + A

= 17[M (c1)]
2=81: Now consider two cases. First, if 1  2
then according to Lemma 7, a long-term xed-fee exclusive contract can replicate the bench-
mark outcome. Therefore, issuing multiple xed-fee licenses cannot be optimal. Second, if
1 > 2, then  (1   2)2   21  (1=16) 

M (c1)
2
; where 1  M(c1)=4 (see the
proof of Assumption 2 in Appendix B). Since    SF =  (1   2)2 ; we must have
LF (k  2)  SF  (1=16)  M (c1)2   (17=81) [M (c1)]2 < 0.
Under Bertrand competition, if k  2 long-term licenses are sold in period 1, then
the industry prots will be zero in period 2 if the new innovation fails. This means that
the total licensing revenue will be at least [M (c1)]2 less than the benchmark prot.
According to Assumption 3 and its proof in Appendix B, 0 < 1   2 < M(c1)   l; we
have  (1   2)2 < 
 
M (c1)  l
2  [M (c1)]2: Hence LF (k  2) < SF :
Proposition 6 If the period 1 innovation is non-drastic, then short-term royalties cannot
be optimal.
Proof. Under Cournot competition with linear demand, we prove by showing that, for any
short-term royalty, there exists a xed-fee licensing scheme that issues a smaller or equal
number of short-term licenses and generates a greater period 1 licensing revenue. By the
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same argument used in the proof of Lemma 8, we can then conclude that the short-term
xed-fee licensing scheme must be more protable than the short-term royalty.
Denote by k the optimal number of licensees in a one-innovation game when xed-
fee licensing is used. We have  R(n) <  FF (k
) according to Kamien and Tauman (1986).
Consider a short-term royalty scheme SR that issues k royalty licenses in period 1. If
k > k; then a short-term xed-fee contract with k licensees generates a greater period 1
licensing revenue and has smaller technology leakage. Now if k < k; then we can consider
a short-term xed-fee contract with k licensees. The period 1 licensing revenue is SF1 >
 FF (k) = k[q(p   c1)   q0(p   c0)] where p is the equilibrium price and q (resp. q0) is the
quantity produced by a licensee (resp. non-licensee), while SR1 =  
R(k) = kq(n)(c0)(c0  c1);
where q(n)(c0) is Cournot quantity with n identical rms whose costs are c0: Since k < k;
we have p > c0 (Kamien and Tauman 1986). In addition, q > max[q0; q(n)(c0)]: Hence

SF (k)
1 > k[q(p  c1)  q0(p  c0)] = k[(q   q0) (p  c0) + q (c0   c1)] > kq (c0   c1) > SR(k)1 :
Under Bertrand competition, any xed-fee license must be exclusive regardless of whether
the innovation is drastic, so the proof used in the drastic innovation case also applies here.
B The cost of technology leakage in Homogenous Good,
Conjectural Variation Oligopoly Models
In the main text, we make assumptions on the costs of technology leakage. Here we verify
that these assumptions are met in homogenous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models
including Cournot competition with linear demand and Bertrand competition.
Proof of Assumption 1. Suppose that a licensing scheme S exists such that the innovators
licensing revenue equals M(cb). Since post-licensing competition takes place among rms
who sell homogenous good at a uniform price, we must have p = pM(cb) > ca and i =
0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n. Now if rm 1 chooses not to license the innovation, then 1 =
q1
 
pM(cb)
  
pM(cb)  ca

> 0. This means that S cannot be an equilibrium. Contradiction.
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Proof of Assumption 2 and 3 Under Cournot Competition with Linear Demand.
Following Lemma 1, we consider a licensing scheme that involves the Right of First O¤er to
the rm who has a cost of cb (rm 1) with the threat of an auction of xed-fee licenses: in
stage 1, the innovator o¤ers rm 1 a xed-fee exclusive license; if rm 1 accepts, then the
game ends; but if rm 1 rejects, then the innovator sells k licenses in stage 2 via a sealed-bid
rst-price auction. The cost of technology leakage is rm 1s net prot in stage 2, which
depends on the number of licenses that will be issued and whether rm 1 places a winning
bid.
Divide the range of possible values for ca into three regions: (i) ca 2 [cb; a+2cb3 ), (ii)
ca 2 [a+2cb3 ; a+cb2 ) and (iii) ca  a+cb2 . In region (i), a rm with cost ca will earn positive
prots in competition with two rms that have cost cb. In region (ii), a rm with cost ca
will earn positive prots in competition with one rm that has cost cb, but zero prot with
two or more rms. In region (iii), a rm with cost ca will be driven out of the market if any
other rm has a cost of cb.
i) Within this region we consider two possibilities, either k  2 or k = 1. We will show
that the licensing revenue from auctioning k  2 licenses has a lower bound and that it is
greater than the licensing revenue from k = 1 licenses. Therefore, the cost of technology
leakage is rm 1s net prot when k  2 licenses are auctioned, which has an upper bound.
If k = 1, then rm 1 will outbid others, since M(cb) > D(ca; cb) + D(cb; ca). In this
case, the winning bid will be the prots that a licensee would earn in competition with rm
1, D(cb; ca) = (a+ ca   2cb)2=9:
If k  2; then the winning bid is at least (a + ca   2cb)2=(k + 2)2, the prot that a rm
with cost ca can earn as a licensee if rm 1 is not among the licensees. Thus, the licensing
revenue must be at least maxk k(a+ca 2cb)2=(k+2)2 = (a+ca 2cb)2=8 > (a+ca 2cb)2=9,
the licensing revenue when k = 1: Next, if rm 1 wins a license, then its bid must be at
least (a + ca   2cb)2=(k + 2)2. Therefore, (ca; cb)  k(cb)  (a + ca   2cb)2=(k + 2)2 
[(a  cb)2=(k+1)2  (a  cb)2=(k+2)2]jk=2 < M(cb)=4: If rm 1 does not win a license, then
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its prot as well as (ca; cb) will be (a  ca  kca+ kcb)2=(k+2)2  (a  cb)2=16 = M(cb)=4:
Further, since ca <
a+2cb
3
; we get (ca; cb)  M(cb)=4 < M(3ca a2 )=4 = 9M(ca)=16.
ii) Within this region, if k  2; then rm 1 can compete in the market only if it wins a
license. This means that the innovator can earn at least 2D(cb): = 8M(cb)=9 by auctioning
2 licenses. Therefore, (ca; cb)  M(cb)=9 < M(2ca   a)=9 = 4M(ca)=9 < 9M(ca)=16.
iii) (ca; cb) = 0.
In sum, (ca; cb) < M(cb)=4 < 9M(ca)=16. Applying the denitions of 1; 2 and l;
we obtain that 1 < M(c1)=4 and l < 9M(c1)=16; therefore 1   2 + l < M(c1) and
l < 
M(c1):
Proof of Assumption 2 and 3 Under Bertrand Competition. Under Bertrand com-
petition, licenses can only be protably sold to a single rm in each period. This is because
Bertrand competition yields zero prot to each rm, unless there is only one rm with a
superior technology. Thus, we can obtain an explicit solution for technology leakage:
(6)  (ca; cb) =

M (cb)  (ca   cb)D(ca) if ca < pM (cb) ;
0 otherwise.
First, suppose that c2 is not drastic relative to c0; then 1 = M(c1)   (c0   c1)D(c0) and
2 = 
M(c2)   (c0   c2)D(c0): Because qM(c1) maximizes prots when cost is c1; we know
1  2 = M(c1)  M(c2) + (c1  c2)D(c0) > (pM(c2)  c1)qM(c2)  M(c2) + (c1  c2)D(c0):
Note that M(c2) = (pM(c2)   c1)qM(c2) + (c1   c2)qM(c2): Therefore, 1   2 > (pM(c2)  
c1)q
M(c2) (pM(c2) c1)qM(c2) (c1 c2)qM(c2)+(c1 c2)D(c0) = (c1 c2)(D(c0) qM(c2)) =
(c1   c2)(D(c0) D(pM(c2))): Since c2 is not drastic relative to c0 this must be positive.
Second, suppose that c2 is drastic relative to c0: In this case 1 = M(c1)  (c0   c1)D(c0)
and 2 = 0; thus 1   2 > 0:
Last, 1   2 + l = M (c1)  (c1   c2)[D (c1) D(c0)] < M (c1) :
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C More General Classes of Downstream Competition
In the main text, we have focused on the case of homogenous good, conjectural variation
oligopoly models, which allows us to impose restrictions on the costs of technology leakage.
For completeness, in this appendix, we solve for the optimal xed-fee licensing contracts
without restricting the nature of downstream competition. In addition to generalizing our
main result, the following results further illustrate the important role played by technology
leakage in our model.
Lemma 10 In a long-term xed-fee contract (f1; f2) with the opt-out clause, if either (i)
0 < 1   2 < M(c1)   l and f2  M(c1)   1; or (ii) M(c1)   l < 1   2 < 0 and
f2  l   2; then LF increases with f2:
Proof. Case (i) is proved in the proof of Lemma 5. An analogous proof can be constructed
for case (ii).
Lemma 11 In a long-term xed-fee contract (f1; f2) with the opt-out clause, if either (i)
1   2 < M(c1)   l < 0 and f2  M(c1)   1; or (ii) 1   2 > M(c1)   l > 0 and
f2  l   2; then LF decreases with f2:
Proof. The following proof applies to case (i). An analogous proof can be constructed for
case (ii).
In period 2, there are two states of nature: 1: innovation is not successful; 2: innovation
is successful. In case 1; the original licensee will continue the contract and get M(c1)  f2;
since M(c1)  f2 > 1: Hence 2 = f2:
In case 2; we separate f2 further into two regions: a) f2  l   2 and b) l   2 < f2 <
M(c1)  1:
(2:a) f2  l   2: If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at
a cost of c1, he gets l   f2; if he opts out, he gets 2. Since l   f2  2; it is optimal for
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the original licensee to continue the original license. This means that 02 = 
M(c2)  l + f2
and  = M(c2)   l: So the innovators incentive to invest is independent of2: Therefore,
her licensing revenue is a constant if f2  l   2.
(2:b) f2 > l   2: If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at a
cost of c1, then he gets l  f2; if he opts out, then he gets 2. Since l  f2 < 2; the original
licensees right to use the old innovation has no value and he will opt out the initial contract.
This means that 02 = 
M(c2)  2 and  = M(c2)  2 f2: In period 1, a rm is willing to
pay LF1 = 
M(c1)+(1 2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

)
 
M (c1)  f2

+2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

2
for an exclusive license. At the same time, LF2 = f2 + 
 
M (c2)  2   f2
2
: Hence,
the total licensing revenue is LF = M(c1) + (1  2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

)
 
M (c1)  f2

+
2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

2+ 

f2 + 
 
M (c2)  2   f2
2
, so @
@f2
LF = 2
 
M (c1)  2   f2

<
2
 
M (c1)  l

< 0: Last, it is easy to verify that LF is continuous at f2 = l   2:
Lemma 12 If either (i) 0 < 1 2 < M(c1) l and f2  M(c1) 1, or (ii) M(c1) l <
1   2 < 0 and f2  l   2; or (iii) 1   2 < M(c1)   l < 0 and f2  M(c1)   1; or
(iv) if 1   2 > M(c1)   l > 0 and f2  l   2, then any equilibrium long-term xed-fee
contract (f1; f2) with the opt-out clause is equivalent to a short-term xed-fee contract with
f = f1:
Proof. Case (i) is proved in the proof of Lemma 6. Analogous proofs can be constructed
for the other cases.
Lemma 13 If either (i) 1   2 < 0 and M(c1)   l > 0; or (ii) M(c1)   l < 0 and
1   2 > 0; then there exists a long-term xed-fee contract that replicates the benchmark
outcome.
Proof. Case (i) is proved in the proof of Lemma 7. An analogous proof can be constructed
for case (ii).
From the above lemmas, we can conclude the following for xed-fee contracts.
37
Proposition 7 (i) If 1   2 and M(c1)  l have di¤erent signs, then there exists a long-
term xed-fee contract that replicates the benchmark outcome; (ii) if they have the same
sign, then the optimal xed-fee license depends on the comparison of their absolute values: if
j1   2j >
M(c1)  l ; then a long-term contract with an upfront payment is optimal and
generates a licensing revenue that is 

M(c1)  l
2
below the benchmark prot, otherwise
a short-term contract is optimal and generates a licensing revenue that is  (1   2)2 below
the benchmark prot.
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